

## Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-01  
INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04  
PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 DODE-00 NSC-05  
NRC-05 /094 W

-----281510Z 009465 /46

R 281440Z MAR 77  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6871  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
USMISSION GENEVA  
USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BONN 05386

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PARM, US, GW, UR  
SUBJECT: CW CONSULTATIONS

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: US DELEGATION BRIEFED FRG  
OFFICIALS, INCLUDING ARMS CONTROL COMMISSIONER RUTH,  
MARCH 24 ON CURRENT STATE OF US THINKING RE POSSIBLE  
CW FORCE POSTURE OPTIONS AND A POSSIBLE APPROACH TO  
ARMS CONTROL. PRINCIPAL GERMAN CONCERNS WERE:  
FORMIDABLE SOVIET CW CAPABILITY, DESIRE FOR ASSURANCE  
OF FULL CONSULTATION IN ADVANCE OF US-USSR BILATERALS,  
PROBLEMS OF VERIFICATION OF A CW AGREEMENT AND  
CONCERN THAT SUCH VERIFICATION NOT IMPACT ON FRG  
INDUSTRY. END SUMMARY

2. FOLLOWING WELCOME BY RUTH, HAUBER, FOREIGN OFFICE  
DIRECTOR FOR CW, OPENED WITH STATEMENT OF FRG CONCERN  
OVER "FORMIDABLE AND GROWING" SOVIET CAPABILITY  
SAYING THAT, IN VIEW OF WIDE RANGE OF CW AGENTS  
INCLUDING HYDROGEN CYANIDE AVAILABLE TO WARSAW PACT,  
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FRG BELIEVED SCOPE OF PROHIBITION OF ANY AGREEMENT  
SHOULD NOT BE LIMITED TO SUPER TOXIC AGENTS. HE SAID  
BASIC GERMAN APPROACH WAS THAT SECURITY OF ALLIANCE  
SHOULD NOT BE IMPAIRED AND IF POSSIBLE SHOULD BE  
IMPROVED, GERMAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRY SHOULD NOT SUFFER  
INTERFERENCE OR DIMUNITION OF EXPORT POSSIBILITIES  
AND VERIFICATION SHOULD NOT ENDANGER INDUSTRIAL

SECRETS. HE ADDED THAT DUAL PURPOSE AGENTS SHOULD BE COVERED BUT VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS FOR THEM SHOULD NOT INTRUDE ON LEGITIMATE INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY.

3. IN DISCUSSION OF THREAT ASSESSMENT, FRG REPS INQUIRED AS TO WHETHER US HAD ANY EVIDENCE OF SOVIET UNDERGROUND PRODUCTION FACILITIES OR DEVELOPMENT OF BINARIES AND SPECULATED THAT SOVIETS MIGHT FIND LIMITED LOCAL USE OF CW INTERESTING AS MEANS OF TESTING NATO RESOLVE. FOLLOWING PRESENTATION OF POSSIBLE FORCE POSTURE OPTIONS BY US REPS, IN WHICH IT WAS STRESSED THAT DISPERSAL OF RETALIATORY STOCKPILE WAS NOT DECISION FOR US AUTHORITIES ALONE, GERMAN REPS NOTED THAT LACK OF AIR DELIVERED MUNITIONS MADE RESPONSE IN KIND TO SOVIET DEEP INTERDICTION ATTACKS IMPOSSIBLE. THEY DID NOT RESPOND IN PLENARY TO OBVIOUS QUESTION OF POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY TO FRG OF POSSIBLE CHANGES IN STOCKPILE CONFIGURATION AND LOCATION OTHER THAN TO SAY THAT, AT MOMENT, THERE WAS LITTLE PUBLIC AWARENESS OF CW ISSUES, INCLUDING THE ROLE OF CW IN WARFARE. (SEE PARA 6 FOR INFORMAL REACTIONS).

4. HAUBER FRAMED INITIAL RESPONSE TO US PRESENTATION OF OUTLINE OF POSSIBLE ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVE IN TERMS OF ITS COMPATABILITY WITH FIVE FRG PRINCIPLES RECENTLY CIRCULATED AT NATO, STATING THAT IT APPEARED TO SATISFY SEVERAL OF THEM. PREDICTABLY, HE FOCUSED ON VERIFICATION DIFFICULTIES, STRESSING THAT WHILE  
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OBSERVED DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS WOULD BE SATISFACTORY, HE DID NOT SEE HOW SUFFICIENT ASSURANCES COULD BE OBTAINED WITH REGARD TO PRODUCTION FACILITIES OR TO DECLARATION OF ALL STOCKS. HE SUGGESTED THAT PHASED DESTRUCTION BE STRUCTURED SO THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE TOTAL AUTOMATICITY IN THE SCHEDULE AND OPPORTUNITY WOULD BE PROVIDED AFTER INITIAL STAGE TO ASSESS RESULTS BEFORE PROCEEDING TO NEXT STAGE. HAUBER ALSO EMPHASIZED DIFFICULT PROBLEMS INHERENT IN VERIFICATION OF PRODUCTION OF DUAL PURPOSE AGENTS. IN THIS CONNECTION HE REITERATED GERMAN CONCERNS RE PROTECTING INDUSTRIAL SECRETS. GERMAN REPS SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS DUAL PURPOSE PROBLEMS COULD BE HANDLED, IN PART, BY QUALIFICATION "SUITABLE FOR MILITARY USE." RUTH INTERVENED TO STRESS THAT HAUBER REACTION WAS PRELIMINARY.

5. IN REVIEWING US-SOVIET CONTACTS AND US INTENTIONS FOR NEXT ROUND OF BILATERALS, US REPS EMPHASIZED THAT

NO NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN UNDERTAKEN, THAT US DEL IN

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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 05386

FORTHCOMING ROUND OF BILATERALS WOULD NOT BE AUTHORIZED TO UNDERTAKE NEGOTIATION OF JOINT INITIATIVE AND THAT ALLIED CONSULTATIONS WOULD BE CONDUCTED PRIOR TO ANY SUCH NEGOTIATION. FRG CCD REP SCHLAICH ASSERTED THAT IF KEY PRINCIPLES, AGREED BY US AND USSR AS JOINT INITIATIVE WERE PRESENTED TO CCD IN TOO DETAILED A FORM, WE MIGHT ENCOUNTER DIFFICULTY IN COMMITTEE, BUT THAT IN ANY CASE SUCH APPROACH PREFERABLE TO PRESENTATION OF JOINT DRAFT. FRG REPS EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR CONSULTATION ASSURANCES, BUT STRESSED NEED TO EXTEND SUCH CONSULTATION TO ALL NATO ALLIES.

6. AS NOTED PARA 3 FRG REPS DID NOT RESPOND IN FORMAL SESSION TO US PROBING CONCERNING ACCEPTABILITY TO FRG OF INCREASED OR DISPERSED STOCKPILE, BUT RUTH SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD US DEL CHIEF THAT HE WAS SENSITIVE TO PROBLEM AND WOULD HAVE TO REFLECT ON HOW TO APPROACH IT, RECOGNIZING THAT THE US HAD NOT MADE A FORMAL  
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PROPOSAL. HAUBER EXPRESSED SURPRISE AND CONCERN THAT RETALIATORY STOCKS ARE ALL STORED AT ONE LOCATION, A FACT OF WHICH HE PREVIOUSLY WAS UNAWARE.

7. COMMENT: IN FUTURE CONSIDERATION OF CW ISSUES, GERMANS WILL HAVE TO STRUGGLE WITH CONTRADICTION INHERENT IN THEIR STRONG INTERESTS IN BOTH VERIFICATION AND PROTECTION OF COMMERCIAL SECRETS. STOESEL

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**Review Markings:**  
Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
22 May 2009  
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